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Now that Catherine Ashton has been appointed the 
European Union’s High Representative for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy, and that Herman van 
Rompuy has become the first permanent President 
of  the  European  Council,  a  more  fundamental 
question is: which foreign policy strategy will they 
actually pursue? 
In its 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS), the 
EU has developed a grand strategy, embracing all 
foreign  policy  instruments  and  resources  at  the 
disposal of the EU and the Member States, but a 
partial one. The ESS tells us how to do things – in a 
preventive, holistic and multilateral way – but it is 
much vaguer on what to do: what are the foreign 
policy priorities of the EU? 
The recent debate about the ESS, resulting in the 
2008  Report  on  the  Implementation  of  the 
European  Security  Strategy,  failed  to  answer  this 
question.  Offering  little  in  terms  of 
recommendations for the future, the Report creates 
an  impression  of  unfinished  business,  which  the 
EU can ill afford now that the Treaty of Lisbon has 
strengthened  the  institutional  set-up,  NATO  has 
launched  a  strategic  debate  to  which  an  EU 
contribution  is  essential,  and  the  EU  risks  being 
overshadowed  by  the  much  more  purposive 
emerging powers.  
A  fully-fledged  strategic  review  is  in  order  to 
complete the ESS. The first rule of strategy-making 
is to know thyself. Seemingly evident, it is actually 
not  that  clear  which  values  and  interests  the  EU 
seeks to safeguard, and which kind of international 
actor it wants to be. Therefore, the EU should start 
its strategic review by looking at itself and try to 
identify the purpose of its foreign policy. But there 
are  many  dangers  in  looking  too  much  into  the 
mirror, and furthermore the EU cannot pretend to 
become a strategic actor if it continues to ignore the 
The Lisbon Treaty now having entered 
into force, it is time for the EU to get 
back  to  work  and  more  specifically  to 
focus on its foreign policy. In a world 
that  is  increasingly  complex  and 
multipolar,  the  EU  must  act 
strategically.  To  avoid  becoming  an 
irrelevant  international  actor,  Brussels 
needs to (1) develop a grand strategy to 
define  the  true  purpose  of  its  foreign 
policy;  (2)  forge  solid  strategic 
partnerships  with  key  global  players; 
and (3) contribute to the building of a 
new effective multilateral system which 
takes  into  account  the  new  global 
structure of power.  
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other strategic players. This is not about knowing 
thy enemy (arguably the EU has no direct enemies, 
although strategic surprises should never be entirely 
ruled out1), but about knowing “the other”. Finally, 
a last principle of strategy-making could be: know 
thy environment, or to put it in other words, know 
the rules of the game. If the EU hopes to become a 
global power, it needs to understand – or better to 
shape – the rules defining international relations. 
A Need for a Grand Strategy 
Which  values  and  interests  should  our  grand 
strategy  safeguard?  Europe  has  a  very  distinctive 
social  model,  combining  democracy,  the  market 
economy  and  strong  government  intervention. 
Preserving  and  strengthening  this  internal  social 
contract  between  the  EU  and  its  citizens, 
guaranteeing  them  security,  economic  prosperity, 
political  freedom  and  social  well-being,  is  the 
fundamental  objective  of  the  EU,  both  internally 
and as a global actor. The conditions that have to 
be  fulfilled  to  allow  that  constitute  our  vital 
interests: defence against any military threat; open 
lines  of  communication  and  trade  (in  physical  as 
well as in cyber space); a secure supply of energy 
and  other  vital  natural  resources;  a  sustainable 
environment;  manageable  migration  flows;  the 
maintenance  of  international  law  and  universally 
agreed  rights;  and  autonomy  of  EU  decision-
making. 
To  safeguard  these  interests,  the  EU  must  be  a 
power,  i.e.  a  strategic  actor  that  consciously  and 
purposely  defines  long-term  objectives,  actively 
pursues these, and acquires the necessary means to 
that end. Which kind of power the EU chooses to 
be  is  in  part  conditioned  by  the  international 
environment.  Marked  by  interpolarity,  defined  as 
“multipolarity in the age of interdependence”2, that 
environment  is  very  challenging,  but  at  the  same 
time presents the EU with an opportunity to pursue 
a  distinctive  grand  strategy.  This  strategy  is 
distinctive in the sense that the emphasis is on a 
holistic approach, putting to use the full range of 
instruments, through partnerships and multilateral 
                                                            
1 Colin S. Gray, “The 21st Century Security Environment and the 
Future of War”. Parameters, vol. 38:4 (2008), pp. 14-26. 
2 Giovanni Grevi, The Interpolar World: A New Scenario. Occasional 
Paper 79, Paris: EUISS, 2009, p. 9. 
institutions, for a permanent policy of prevention 
and stabilization. Contrary to US grand strategy for 
instance, the EU favours rule-based multilateralism, 
not  just  any  form  of  multilateralism;  and  it 
promotes  its  values  globally  but  does  not  try  to 
enforce them.  
The approach which the EU has pursued so far is 
in  line  with  this  grand  strategy,  but  practice  has 
revealed a number of limitations. Especially vis-à-
vis  other  global  actors  the  classic  EU  strategy  of 
“positive conditionality”, i.e. the offer of benefits in 
return  for  security  cooperation  and  economic, 
social  and  political  reforms,  has  been  rather 
unsuccessful. Interdependence is too great and the 
scale of things is too vast for the EU to have any 
serious  leverage.  On  the  contrary,  pontificating 
without acting only serves to undermine EU soft 
power. 
A Need for Truly Strategic Partnerships 
In  a  world  that  is  increasingly  multipolar  and 
interdependent – this is to say interpolar – the EU 
cannot  continue  to  approach  emerging  global 
powers  without  a  clear  strategy.  The  EU  has 
therefore created a new instrument to engage with 
other  global  actors:  strategic  partnerships.  The 
actual  strategy  behind  these  is  far  from  clear 
however. 
A  first  and  major  problem  is  the  lack  of 
understanding  of  the  concept  of  strategic 
partnership.  It  has  never  been  defined  and  is 
consequently  seen  and  interpreted  differently  by 
many  actors  within  the  EU,  without  mentioning 
those outside the EU.  
Another major problem relates to the countries that 
qualify  for  a  strategic  partnership.  There  are  few 
established criteria, except that partnerships can be 
signed  with  “third  countries,  and  international, 
regional  or  global  organisations  which  share  the 
principles  [of  democracy,  the  rule  of  law,  the 
universality and indivisibility of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, 
the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect 
for  the  principles  of  the  United  Nations  Charter 
and  international  law]”  (Treaty  of  Lisbon,  Article 
22)  and  that  “the  strategic  partner  status  is 
specifically intended to derive from the capacity of  
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a country to exert a significant influence on global 
issues”. 3 At this point, not counting relations with 
the  US,  Canada  and  NATO,  the  EU  has  or  is 
negotiating seven strategic partnerships with other 
States (Brazil, China, India, Japan, Mexico, Russia, 
and  South  Africa),  and  one  with  an  international 
organization  (the  African  Union).  It  seems  quite 
obvious that not each of these is equally strategic. 
Most  of  these  countries  undeniably  exercise 
regional  leadership  or  are  a  significant  player  for 
one specific global issue. This makes them strategic 
as regards one region, or one issue. But is this a 
sufficient  condition  to  make  them  a  strategic 
partner? Can Mexico and South Africa really be put 
on  an  identical  level  with  China,  Russia  and  the 
United States?  
The danger is to overstretch the concept, leading to 
an  amalgam  between  important  relationships  and 
strategic  relationships.  Such  overstretch  creates 
confusion within the EU, but also in the eyes of its 
partners  and  in  the  way  they  interpret  Europe’s 
ambitions. In a sense we have been very successful 
at confusing our partners and becoming ever less 
strategic to them.  
So, how can we actually make the EU partnerships 
strategic?  A  truly  strategic  use  of  the  strategic 
partnerships, i.e. in function of EU foreign policy, 
must  start  from  a  thorough  assessment  of  EU 
interests in the various regions of the globe and a 
clearer definition of its objectives towards them. At 
the same time, a prioritization of actions to be taken 
to tackle the global challenges, in function of the 
Union’s  vital  interests,  is  in  order.  On  many  of 
these issues – climate, migration, energy – the EU 
already  has  elaborate  policies  –  these  must  be 
integrated  into  its  broader  foreign  policy 
framework.  
Rather  than  objectives  in  their  own  right,  the 
strategic  partnerships  are  instruments  to  further 
“effective multilateralism”. The EU could identify 
shared interests with each of its strategic partners, 
in order to establish in a number of priority policy 
areas  effective  practical  cooperation  with  those 
strategic  partners  that  share  EU  interests  in  that 
specific  domain,  with  the  ultimate  aim  of 
                                                            
3 “Towards an EU-Mexico Strategic Partnership”, COM(2008) 
447, Brussels, 15 July 2008. 
institutionalizing  those  forms  of  cooperation  and 
linking  them  up  with  the  permanent  multilateral 
institutions.  Such  a  pragmatic  approach  of 
coalition-building  and  practical  cooperation,  on 
very specific issues to start with, can expand into 
broader  areas,  including  with  regard  to  values.  If 
e.g.  it  is  unlikely  that  we  will  see  China  at  the 
forefront  of  democracy  promotion,  it  has  an 
economic interest in promoting the rule of law, if 
only  to  ensure  that  the  mining  concessions  it 
acquires are not simultaneously offered to someone 
else.  
Rather than asking with which State or organization 
a strategic partnership should be concluded, the EU 
should look beyond those already in existence and 
involve  actors  in  constructive  cooperation  in 
function  of  their  power  in  the  specific  area 
concerned. In practice, two types of partners may 
eventually  emerge:  those  with  which  the  EU 
establishes  cooperation  in  a  comprehensive  range 
of areas – probably at least Russia, China and India, 
if they would be inclined to such cooperation that 
is,  and  of  course  the  US;  and  those  with  whom 
cooperation  focuses  on  a  more  limited  range  of 
issues or regions.  
For the strategic partnerships to work, the EU must 
speak with one voice – other global actors are only 
too adept at playing off one Member State against 
the other. “Self-divide and be ruled over” is not a 
strategy bound to serve European interests... At the 
very least, Member States should subscribe to a rule 
of transparency and automatically inform the EU, at 
an  early  stage,  of  all  important  bilateral 
arrangements with strategic partners, so as to allow 
for debate in the EU institutions and de-conflicting 
of potentially competing interests.  Ideally, on key 
issues, strategic partnerships could establish the EU 
as the unique interlocutor on a series of key issues, 
hence  limiting  the  margin  of  manoeuvre  of 
individual Member States.  
With the implementation of the Treaty of Lisbon, a 
greater  role  could  be  devoted  to  the  EEAS  – 
instead of the Commission generally in charge of 
strategic partnerships to this day  – in centralizing 
and coordinating the various strategic partnerships, 
linking them up with a coherent foreign policy.   
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Without  strategy,  the  strategic  partnerships  will 
quickly become irrelevant. With a strategy, they can 
potentially become very effective instruments of a 
united European foreign policy. 
A Need for a Reformed Multilateralism 
Bilateral strategic partnerships will not be sufficient 
to  shape  the  future  global  order,  however  –  the 
multilateral  architecture  as  such  must  also  be 
reformed.  If  the  world  is  surely  becoming 
increasingly multipolar – or even interpolar – it is 
still unclear whether that multipolarity will lead to 
more cooperation or competition. History taught us 
that the emergence of new powers challenging the 
old  order  can  lead  to  many  different  scenarios, 
depending on the players’ ability to adapt to each 
other  and  to  their  environment.  We  should  also 
take from history that interpolarity is not inherently 
cooperation-driven,  as  illustrated  by  the 
competition between 19th century great powers in a 
world  that  was  already  multipolar  and 
interdependent  (even  more  interdependent  than 
today, according to several indicators such as trade 
to GDP or capital flows4). 
The  EU  preference  for  a  cooperative  form  of 
multipolarity  is  well -known  as  it  constantly 
promotes an international order based on  systemic 
and  rule -based  multilateralism   referred  to   in 
Brussels jargon as “effective multilateralism”. This 
preference inscribes itself in a long-term strategy for 
promoting  peace  and  multilateral  cooperation, 
based  on  a  strong  historical  conviction  that 
multilateralism is the best avenue towards peace.  
A global reform of multilateralism is clearly in the 
interest of the EU which “would have nothing to 
gain and everything to lose if it operated in a world 
governed by unstable power games in which it was 
one among various competing power players”5. But 
a  reform  of  multilateralism  would  also  be  in  the 
                                                            
4  See  Richard  E.  Baldwin,  Philippe  Martin,  Two  Waves  of 
Globalisation: Superficial Similarities, Fundamental Differences. NBER 
Working Paper 6904, Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic 
Research, January 1999. 
5  Alvaro de Vasconcelos,  “Multilateralising  Multipolarity”,  in 
Giovanni Grevi and Alvaro de Vasconcelos (ed.), Partnerships for 
Effective Multilateralism: EU Relations with Brazil, China, India and 
Russia.  Chaillot  Paper  109,  Paris:  EU  Institute  for  Security 
Studies, May 2008, p. 24. 
general interest because we all have everything to 
lose and nothing to gain from a world governed by 
unstable power games if it leads to a paralysis in the 
resolution of key global challenges such as climate 
change  and  nuclear  proliferation,  for  the  entire 
system is equally threatened in the end. 
As stated in the 2003 ESS: “in a world of global 
threats,  global  markets  and  global  media,  our 
security and prosperity increasingly depend on an 
effective multilateral system.” And therefore, “the 
development  of  a  stronger  international  society, 
well  functioning  international  institutions  and  a 
rule-based international order is our objective. (…) 
We  want  international  organisations,  regimes  and 
treaties  to  be  effective  in  confronting  threats  to 
international peace and security, and must therefore 
be ready to act when their rules are broken.”6 
However,  despite  the  fact  that  the  EU  arguably 
favours  a  multilateral  approach  to  international 
relations7, it is important to point out that not all 
forms of multilateralism are favourable to the EU. 
For instance, the formation of ad hoc bilateral or 
multilateral alliances – especially those excluding the 
EU – could potentially be damaging to Europe; a 
G-2 between China and America e.g. would slowly 
but inevitably make the US lean towards Asia, and 
render Europe increasingly irrelevant. 
Moreover, even where the world is cooperative, it is 
only irregularly so, and in an unstructured manner 
at that. Our contemporary era could be dubbed the 
age  of  multi-multilateralism,  defined  as  the 
strengthening  of  an  asymmetrical  and  dynamic 
cooperation  process  in  which  (1)  countries  are 
becoming  members  of  a  variety  of  overlapping 
institutions,  creating  a  new  mosaic  of  multilateral 
interactions; (2) states meet continuously in multiple 
forums hence increasing the density of international 
relations;  (3)  formal  institutions  (e.g.  the  UN) 
cohabit with informal forums (e.g. the G20)  in a 
                                                            
6  A  Secure  Europe  in  a  Better  World  – European  Security  Strategy, 
Brussels, 12 December 2003, p. 9. 
7  We say  “arguably”  because  EU  rhetoric  promotes  effective 
multilateralism, but its actions might sometimes be seen by other 
parties – rightly or wrongly – as not faithful to that principle.  
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moving  and  overlapping  configuration.8 
Nevertheless,  even  in  the  age  of  multi -
multilateralism, cooperation between global actors 
remains conditional and certainly not automatic. 
So, here is the obvious question: how do we get to 
an effective multilateral order?  There is of course 
no  clear-cut  answer  to  that  question,  but  our 
intuition tells us that we should start with what we 
already have, with a special attention to the latest 
developments, including the recent upgrading of 
the G20 from ministerial to head of state level, 
largely  seen  as  a  positive  signal  by  emerging 
countries, indicating that they are now considered 
as key players in dealing with global challenges. This 
recognition  was  most  welcome  in  New  Delhi, 
Beijing and Brasilia.  
Somehow, the displacement of the G8 by the G20 
was  also  positive  for  the  EU,  at  least  for  two 
reasons. First, Brussels is officially the 20 th member 
of the G20, while it was only the 9th member of the 
G8.  To  many,  this  might  only  be  a  symbolic 
nuance,  as  in  both  cases  the  EU  has  the  same 
“rights”  and  “obligations”  as  the  other  members 
minus the right to chair and host summits, hence 
no  capacity  to  fully  shape  the  agenda.  But  in 
international  politics,  rhetoric  and  the  choice  of 
words are never innocent; hence, in some way, the 
G20 is arguably a recognition of the “emerging” or 
“global  power”  status  of  the  EU  in  international 
affairs as much as that of China, India or Brazil.  
Second, the EU might show a more united front 
within  the  G20  than  within  the  G8  because  past 
experience has shown that pre-summit cooperation 
and  coordination  was  greater  ahead  of  G20  than 
G8  summits.9  Since  the  level  of  meetings  was 
upgraded to heads of state and the agenda enlarged, 
there is even a visible trend towards more internal 
cooperation, on the basis that a stronger European 
voice is needed in a forum where Europe represents 
only one fifth of the participants (as opposed to 
                                                            
8 Thomas Renard, A BRIC in the World: Emerging Powers, Europe, 
and the Coming Order. Egmont Paper 31, Brussels: Egmont – The 
Royal Institute for International Relations, October 2009, p. 15. 
9 Skander Nasra, Dries Lesage, Jan Orbie, Thijs Van de Graaf, 
Mattias Vermeiren, The EU in the G8 System: Assessing EU Member 
States’  Involvement.  EUI  Working  Paper  RSCAS  2009/45,  San 
Domenico: European University Institute, September 2009. 
half  in  the  G8).  Indeed,  ahead  of  the  Pittsburgh 
summit, the EU gave a positive sign when releasing 
a  communiqué  stating  the  common  “agreed 
language”  for  the  Summit,  which  also  contained 
declarations  on  development,  climate  change  and 
energy  security,  i.e.  topics  mirroring  a  broader 
agenda for the G20. A stronger and more united 
European front will send a positive signal to our 
strategic partners. 
Nonetheless, regarding the role of the EU in the 
G20, two important questions remain open:  
(1)  Who  will  represent  the  EU  at  the  next  G20 
Summit in Toronto next June? Indeed, the Treaty 
of Lisbon is not clear regarding to who will replace 
the President of the Commission and the rotating 
Presidency. Whether it is Van Rompuy or Ashton 
that accompanies José Manuel Barroso to Toronto 
might  send  a  symbolic  signal.  But  whoever  is 
designated  needs  to  strengthen  European 
coordination  within  the  G20  and  to  ensure 
coordination with the EEAS which should receive 
more authority in terms of foreign policy planning, 
including regarding global challenges and strategic 
partnerships. 
(2) How do we link the new G20 up with effective 
multilateralism? Indeed, if the empowerment of the 
G20  was  a  good  option  available  to  make  sure 
emerging powers feel involved in the resolution of 
today’s global challenges, it can only be a transitory 
phase  pending  a  broader  reform  of  the  global 
multilateral architecture. If we want Russia, China, 
India or Brazil to abide by the rules of the WTO, 
the IMF  or the UN,  we have to strengthen (and 
eventually reshape) these institutions. 
However, such reform will take time and a lot of 
difficult  political  decisions.  In  the  meantime,  the 
G20 can be used as a proxy to formal organizations 
provided  it  is  globally  accepted  that  it  is  only  a 
temporary  fix  and  that  it  does  not  replace  but 
complements the UN Security Council. 
The development of the G20 as a temporary proxy 
for  global  institutions  is  a  necessary  exception  to 
“effective  multilateralism”  because  in  today’s 
interpolar  world  most  issues  are  globally 
interrelated, hence requiring enhanced cooperation 
and coordination among countries worldwide. Due  
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to  its  composition  (all  countries  of  significant 
importance are represented) the G20 constitutes at 
this  time  the  best  available  forum  to  discuss 
effectively  global  challenges  and  ways  to  solve 
them. However, the EU must make sure that the 
decisions  taken  during  the  G20  comply  with  the 
international  rules  and  are  linked  with  and 
implemented through the permanent international 
organizations, e.g. UN agencies. 
Conclusion 
“Hell  is  other  people”  (“l’enfer  c’est  les  autres”) 
wrote Jean-Paul Sartre, meaning that we define our 
own  identity  based  on  the  perceptions  and  our 
relationship  with  other  parties.  If  Sartre  were  to 
observe  the  EU  today,  becoming  less  and  less 
relevant  in  the  eyes  of  its  significant  others,  he 
could very well come to the conclusion that he has 
unwittingly described the position of the EU in the 
international system... 
But the future lies in hope, not in despair. In order 
to find its place in a world characterized by moving 
asymmetrical  multipolarity  and  multi-
multilateralism,  the  EU  must  start  acting 
strategically now. Indeed, if the EU really wants to 
step from being a global actor – defined by global 
presence – to being a global power – defined by 
global influence – it needs a global strategy. It needs 
a grand strategy. 
This strategy will inevitably be conditioned by the 
global environment (interpolarity) but it should not 
be entirely dependent upon that environment, i.e. 
our  strategy  should  aim  at  shaping  the  global 
environment as much as it will be shaped by it and 
avoid the trap of mere reactivity which has defined 
EU foreign policy so far. In the words of Brigadier-
General  (Ret.)  Jo  Coelmont,  “while  the  EU  is 
playing  ping  pong,  the  others  are  playing  chess”. 
With  Van  Rompuy  and  Ashton,  Europe  was 
offered a new King and a new Queen. So let’s play 
chess! 
Thomas  Renard  is  Research  Fellow  and 
Sven Biscop is Director of the Security & 
Global  Governance  Programme  at 
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